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The Diminishing Signaling Value of Patents between Early Rounds of 
Venture Capital Financing 
 
1. Introduction 
Patents reflect improvements in innovation and can contribute to the performance of firms and 
their market value (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Griliches, 1981; Hall, 2004; Hall et al., 
2005).  The linkage between patents and firm performance has been attributed largely to 
monopolistic market rights and future technology options, protection from competitors, and 
improvements in the negotiating position of patent holders with partners, investors and 
remaining stakeholders  (Blind et al., 2006; Gans et al., 2002; Giuri et al., 2007; Harabi, 1995; 
Helmers and Rogers, 2011; Levitas and Chi, 2010; Silverman and Baum, 2002; Teece, 2000).1   
A relatively less studied linkage between patents and firm growth is the value of patents 
as signals and situations where external investors, such as venture capital firms (VCFs), are 
attracted to firms with patents.  Indeed, there are good theoretical reasons to expect such 
relationship (Graham et al., 2009; Heeley et al., 2007; Long, 2002).  For instance, in knowledge 
intensive industries, the value of emerging firms that seek external finance can be difficult to 
assess because such firms often lack a track record and they are confronted with technical, 
scientific and regulatory challenges that are either unknown ex ante or difficult to manage ex 
post (Harhoff, 2011). Ownership of patents, however, can signal the potential of a firm to 
external investors through possible future developments with commercial value (Hagedoorn et 
al., 2000; Heeley et al., 2007).  Further, because patents confer monopolistic market rights, 
which can then lead to sustainable competitive advantage, investors may place a market value 
on these rights, and consequently invest in the firm that possesses them.   
To corroborate such theoretical expectations a handful of empirical studies has 
documented that patents attract prominent VCFs, prompt VCFs to invest faster and generally 
                                                 
1 On a macro level, patents have been associated with increasing national economic growth and the 
development and diffusion of knowledge (Blind and Jungmittag, 2008; Shapiro and Hassett, 2005). 
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increase the amounts invested in firms that own them (Audretsch et al., 2012; Baum and 
Silverman, 2004; Cao and Hsu, 2011; Conti et al., 2013; Engel and Keilbach, 2007; Häussler et 
al., 2009; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Mann and Sager, 2007). 2 In this literature, only few studies 
tease out the signaling function of patents from the economic function (Cao and Hsu, 2011; Hsu 
and Ziedonis, 2013).  Further, in this body of work the effect of patents on venture capital 
attraction has mostly been studied as a snap shot in time by focusing, for instance, on the 
amount of venture capital raised by a target firm over a certain period. As a result, what is 
largely unknown is whether the signaling value of patents in attracting VCFs diminishes over 
time as investors and target firms become more acquainted with each other. This question is the 
point of departure for the present study which contributes to a scant literature that deals with the 
dynamics of patent signals.3 
To form our theoretical expectations we reflect upon the main arguments regarding the 
relationship between patents and venture capital attraction.  These arguments focus, in large 
part, on the reduction of information asymmetries between VCFs and target firms.  But, if such 
asymmetries lessen as VCFs and target firms become more familiar with each other over time, 
then the value of patents as a signal should also decrease. To study this proposition we leverage 
the tendency of VCFs to invest in target firms through sequential rounds of financing.  Through 
such rounds, VCFs provide funds to a particular firm after it has met certain milestones that 
relate, mainly, to technical progress (Gompers, 1995). This sequential structure of VC 
investments allows us to detect patterns that would otherwise not be apparent.  More 
specifically, each additional round of financing can reduce the information asymmetries 
between VCFs and the target firm because VCFs gather new information about the firm through 
monitoring, management and other forms of hands-on involvement with the firms they invest in 
(Gompers, 1995; Ruhnka and Young, 1987; Wang and Zhou, 2004). Accordingly, the effect of 
                                                 
2 There is also evidence linking patents to successful Initial Public Offerings (e.g. Cockburn and 
MacGarvie, 2009; Heeley et al., 2007).  
3 The present study is also informative for the stream of literature investigating whether venture capital 
promotes or follows innovation (Hirukawa and Ueda, 2011; Ueda and Hirukawa, 2008). 
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patents on attracting venture capital via a signaling process should diminish through sequential 
rounds of financing.  
To test our theoretical expectations we employ a rich dataset that measures patent 
activity (granted patents and number of patent applications) from firm birth to the first round of 
financing and then again from the first round of financing to the second round for more than 580 
U.S.-based dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs) that received funds from VCFs from 2001 to 
2011. We focus our attention on the first two rounds of financing because in these rounds 
information asymmetries between investors and target firms are expected to be more 
pronounced.  Therefore, by concentrating on these rounds we can detect the impact of 
information asymmetries on the effectiveness of patent activity as a signal. We focus on 
biotechnology because it is a knowledge intensive industry in which information asymmetries 
between investors and firms are expected to be significant. Hence, patents as signals could be 
relevant in this industry (Higgins et al., 2011; Janney and Folta, 2003). Furthermore, patents are 
popular among biotechnology firms (Fligstein, 1996) and existing evidence suggests that 
compared to other high technology industries, investors weight patents more heavily in 
biotechnology when they make investments decisions (Sichelman and Graham, 2010) perhaps 
because of the strong link between innovation and patents in that industry (Arundel and Kabla, 
1998). Biotechnology is also an industry that receives large amounts of (staged) venture capital 
investments reflecting the risky nature of the industry as well as the potential for high returns 
(Baum and Silverman, 2004; Gompers and Lerner, 2001).  Together, these industry 
characteristics suggest that if patent activity serves as a signal for investors whose value 
diminishes over time, evidence of such dynamics should be apparent across biotechnology 
firms.  
For our empirical analysis, we construct models that associate patent activity before and 
after a round of financing with the amount invested to each firm and we control for regional and 
VCF-specific characteristics that could influence the level of investment. To separate the 
function of patents as a signal from their economic value potential, both of which can attract 
investors and capital, we account for the differential (economic) quality of patents.  We also 
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control for the firm growth stage funds are directed to as well as for the reputation of the 
investors, both of which can influence the amount of capital invested in a firm. To isolate the 
strength of patents as a signal from other signals firms can employ we include relevant control 
variables, such as the presence of distinguished scientists on the board of directors.  
Our interest in the value of patents as signaling mechanism for capital investments in 
small firms and specifically on whether such value diminishes over time is motivated by more 
than academic curiosity.  Answers to these questions have important policy implications.  The 
number of patents and patent applications have increased substantially over the years (Kim and 
Marschke, 2004; Kortum and Lerner, 1999) and so have the costs associated with processing 
patents. Such issues have prompted questions about the effectiveness of the current patent 
system and especially with regard to the degree that it puts smaller firms in a disadvantage and 
thus potentially hinders innovation (Bessen and Meurer, 2008; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). 
Assessing whether patents increase private sector investments in small firms and whether such 
increase is affected by the familiarity between VCFs and target firms, needs to be taken into 
account when policy makers and other stakeholders consider the effectiveness of the current 
patent system.  
We proceed with the rest of the paper as follows:  In section 2 we review the literature 
on the functions of VCFs and how patents can act as signals and form our hypotheses.  In 
sections 3 and 4 we present our methodology and data.  In section 5 we present our results and 
we conclude in section 6. 
2. How patents can act as signals to investors 
 
In their most common form of arrangement, venture capital firms pool capital from institutional 
investors such as pension funds and university endowments.  VCFs, in turn, use these capital 
pools to make investments and tie their compensation to the returns of those investments.  
Because the VCFs manage a rather small share of the funds maintained by institutional 
investors, the risk exposure of each institutional investor is relatively limited.  Accordingly, 
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VCFs can afford to invest in risky ventures that have the potential to yield returns above 25 
percent per year so that they maximize their compensation as well as the compensation of the 
institutional investors (Zider, 1998). 
 A popular investment target for VCFs is young firms in high technology areas such as 
biotechnology.  These firms offer investors a potential for high returns (Carpenter and Petersen, 
2002) but also high risk as they grapple with highly complex scientific problems associated long 
research cycles and challenging legal environments (DiMasi and Grabowski, 2007; Häussler 
and Zademach, 2007).  Because of such conditions and because of their young age, firms in 
such sectors may find it difficult to generate current cash flows or establish a record of future 
cash flows.  Accordingly, even when firms in such sectors fully understand their potential, they 
might still find it difficult to convey it to VCFs. This creates a mismatch in the information 
possessed by firms and that possessed by VCFs.  As a result, the relationship between VCFs and 
target firms before an investment takes place is commonly prone to information asymmetries 
(Cumming, 2005; Sahlman, 1990).  
 To overcome such information asymmetries, firms seeking capital often use signals that 
partly substitute for the lack of an established record and can portray their potential (Busenitz et 
al., 2005; Certo et al., 2001; Podolny, 1993, 2010; Zhang and Wiersema, 2009). In fact, 
whenever information asymmetries are present, VCFs tend to rely on signals of this sort before 
they make investment decisions (Amit et al., 1990; Higgins and Gulati, 2006) because 
separating, a priori , high-quality start-ups from firms with less potential can be difficult 
(Davila et al., 2003). Along these lines, a number of studies demonstrate that, in general, signals 
can reduce information asymmetries (e.g. Cohen and Dean, 2005; Gimmon and Levie, 2010; 
Higgins et al., 2011; Hsu, 2007; Janney and Folta, 2003; Mishra et al., 1998). 
The next relevant question then is whether patents can effectively act as such a signal.  
Strong signals are observable and costly to imitate (Cohen and Dean, 2005; Spence, 1973).  
Additionally, signals which are governed by strong institutions and hence conform to certain 
institutional standards tend to increase in value (Janney and Folta, 2003).  This holds largely 
because conformity reduces variation across signals and can thus limit the impact that the 
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subjectivity of the receiver can have on the valuation of the signal (Fischer and Reuber, 2007; 
Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  Patents would therefore appear to meet the requirements for a 
valuable signal because they are easily observable, costly to acquire (Graham et al., 2009) and 
are governed strictly. For firms in knowledge intensive industries where information 
asymmetries are typically strong (Chaddad and Reuer, 2009), patents may have increased value 
for investment decisions (Sichelman and Graham, 2010) because they relate to invention and 
innovation which in turn can lead to commercial gains (Acs et al., 2002; Arundel and Kabla, 
1998; Griliches, 1998).  
Empirical evidence on whether patents actually serve a signaling function that augments 
the accumulation of capital for a given firm is scarce as it amounts, as far as we are aware, to 
two contributions.4  The first study is by Cao and Hsu (2011) who find that startups with patents 
were more likely to issue an IPO; the authors demonstrate the signaling function of patents by 
empirically controlling for a number of remaining factors that can lead to the issuance of an IPO 
(e.g. growth options of a given firm and technological uncertainty). Nevertheless,  Cao and Hsu 
(2011) focus on the impact of patents on the occurrence of an IPO without investigating the 
impact of patents on intermediary financial milestones a company needs to go through before it 
issues an IPO.  Accordingly, whether patents had a stronger effect in the early financial 
performance of the firm when compared to the later financial performance as measured by the 
IPO was not part of the analysis. The second relevant study we identified, by Hsu and Ziedonis 
(2013) is the most informative with respect to the potential dynamics in the signaling 
contribution of patents. In their analysis of firm valuations, the authors find that patents are 
more effective in attracting prominent investors and boosting firm valuations during early 
                                                 
4The scarcity of research can largely be credited to the inherent difficulties of attributing positive 
associations of patent activity measures and capital investments solely to signaling. In particular, while 
some studies report that larger patent portfolios associate with enhanced performance metrics such as the 
issuance of an IPO and the growth of external financing for a given firm whether such relationships 
emanate from the signaling value of patents or from the economic value of patents is not entirely clear 
(Audretsch et al., 2012; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Conti et al., 2013; Engel and Keilbach, 2007; Mann 
and Sager, 2007). A quote from Conti et al. (2013) describes the issue with precision: ...we cannot 
empirically separate the signaling value of patents from their productive contribution..”. Finally, note that 
while Häussler et al. (2009) provide evidence of patents serving as signals, they do not study the 
accumulation of funds and as such it is difficult to extrapolate their findings to our case.  
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investment rounds, which is a finding that supports the expectation that patents act as a signal 
whose value diminishes over time.5  
In sum, the evidence on whether the signaling value of patents wanes once investors 
have a better insight into the value of the firms they injected capital is particularly thin. Hence, 
it is difficult to infer whether and how the value of patents as signal diminishes once the quality 
of the firm is assessed more closely by investors.  
To answer this question we refer to the literature that examines how VCFs reduce 
information asymmetries once they have invested in a firm.  The starting point of this literature 
is the basic insight that information asymmetries lead to agency problems (Fama, 1980; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  A major task of VCFs is therefore to reduce agency problems of this sort.  
A typical mechanism that VCFs use for this purpose is to provide funds in rounds of financing 
(Neher, 1999; Wang and Zhou, 2004).  Under this mechanism, target firms receive funds of a 
particular round conditional on having received funds in a previous round (and have met certain 
milestones).  Between rounds, VCFs become actively involved in the day-to-day operations of 
the target firm via consulting and monitoring (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Rosenstein et al., 
1993).  In doing so, VCFs follow the progress of the firms they invest in, evaluate their 
prospects and generally get more acquainted with their activities and potential.  It follows that 
information asymmetries between VCFs and target firms should decrease under these 
conditions.  In environments with reduced information asymmetries the value of signals tends to 
decrease (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Higgins and Gulati, 2006).  By extension, once a VCF is 
                                                 
5 In particular, in their analysis of firm valuations, the authors include a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the valuation refers to the first or second round of investment and report a positive 
coefficient for the interaction term of this variable with the patent activity variable; implying thus that 
patent activity is more effective in boosting firm valuation for early investment rounds. Besides 
differences in sample size (370 versus 530 firms), period of analysis (1975 to 1999 versus 2001 to 2011), 
industry focus (semiconductor versus biotechnology) and different measures of patent activity (patent 
stocks versus applications and granted patents) a fundamental distinction of our work is that we are 
interested in the  transition of the signal value of a patent after the first round of investment has been 
completed, where we expect information asymmetries between firms and VCFs to greatly diminish.  
Accordingly, we treat investments in round 1 and round 2 as separate and we do not aggregate them in a 
composite “early rounds” measure. As a result, we study the dynamics of the signaling value of patents 
between early rounds of financing while Hsu and Ziedonis (2013) focus on the dynamics between early 
and later stage financing. 
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familiar with the target firm, the effectiveness of patents as signals for attracting additional 
funds is therefore expected to be limited.   
More specifically, it may be reasonable to expect that patents, through signaling effects, 
can augment the amounts of venture capital raised by firms in their first round of financing.  
Patents, however, should not be expected to have a significant signaling effect on the amount 
raised in the second round of financing because the, initially, hidden quality of the firm should 
now be more apparent to the VCF.  Indeed, insofar patents are a quality signal, those acquired 
after the first round should not materially influence the amount of funds raised in the second 
round.6  We expect this to hold because if the unobserved quality of the firm is, in large part, 
revealed to the VCF, the need for additional signals lessens.7  Taken together, the foregoing 
discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1: Patent activity before the first round of financing acts as a signal that increases the 
amount of funds raised in the first round of financing 
H2: Patent activity before the second round of financing does not act as a signal that 
increases the amount of funds raised in the second round of financing 
To illustrate our theoretical expectations, Figure 1 presents the dynamic nature of the 
interaction between VCFs and target firms. This interaction underpins the diminishing signaling 
value of patent activity and forms the basis of our hypotheses.    
-----Figure 1 about here ---- 
 
In the next section, we explain how we go about testing empirically our hypotheses.  
                                                 
6 Note that if the quality of the firm changes after the first round, patents after the first round can again act 
as a quality signal primarily for new investors.  For investors that participated in the first round we expect 
the day to day interactions with the firm to alleviate their need for additional signals.  For our sample the 
large majority of firms received funds from the same sole investor and very few firms received funds 
from a different set of investors between rounds. As such, we expect our main hypotheses to hold for the 
vast majority of cases at hand.  
7 Following the same line of reasoning, if patents are valued by VCFs primarily for their implied 
discounted rents, patents after the first round should be expected to increase the amount of funds for the 
second round as well. 
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3. Methods and Procedures 
 
To empirically test our hypotheses that the signaling value of patents will tend to decline as 
capital investment in small firms proceeds in sequential rounds, we need to associate the patent 
activity of a firm with the incremental amount of venture capital it attracts while information 
asymmetries between investors and the firm diminish over time. We operationalize patent 
activity with the number of granted patents a firm has received and the number of patent 
applications it has filled. To test whether the effectiveness of patent activity as a signal declines 
as a result of reduced information asymmetries we build two empirical models. In the first, the 
sum of venture capital funds raised by a given firm in the first round of financing when 
information asymmetries are expected to be stronger is regressed on patent activity.  In the 
second model, the sum of venture capital funds raised by a given firm during the second round 
of financing at which time information asymmetries are expected to decline, is again regressed 
on patent activity measures.  The dependent variable in each model is the natural log of the total 
amount of VC funding raised by a given biotechnology firm in round 1 (model 1) or round 2 
(model 2). We present the right-hand side variables below.   
 We include patent activity as an explanatory variable in both models. We separate the 
number of granted patents from the number of submitted applications because their signaling 
values might differ in subtle but important ways (Gans et al., 2008; Popp et al., 2004).  For 
instance, preparing a patent application is a lengthy and time consuming process which entails 
the presentation of complex technical issues in a structured format (Häussler et al., 2009).   
Further, during the correspondence of the applicant with the patent office, the applicant may be 
prompted to fine-tune the application, become familiar with more strands of relevant research 
and generally be exposed to situations that can mature the company and help it develop.  In fact, 
mainly because of the harmonized strict requirements that a firm needs to comply with for all of 
its patent applications, it is conceivable that the patent acquisition process is subject to a 
learning curve.  In turn, emerging firms that have applied for a number of patents may be 
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learning more by being more often involved in the patent acquisition process.8  Accordingly, the 
number of patent applications may have a signaling value in that investors may view firms 
developing further rather than sitting idle.9  In contrast, granted patents may signal that firms are 
well down the path of the learning curve.  It is therefore of interest to test whether the pull on 
capital is sensitive to the different potential signaling value offered by granted patents and 
experience with patent applications. Indeed empirical evidence indicates that patent applications 
may have a stronger signaling effect than patents in attracting venture capital faster and at larger 
volume (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Häussler et al., 2009). For all these reasons, we consider 
these two forms of patent activity separately in our models.   
For the first round of financing we measure the number of patents and patent 
applications from firm birth until the date of financing and expect positive signs for the 
corresponding coefficients. Such signs would indicate that patent activity acts as a signal and 
increases the level of venture capital funds invested in the focal firm (PatentApp_1 and 
PatentGrant_1). For the second round of financing we maintain our measures of patent activity 
we use in the first specification and we also add two independent variables that measure the 
number of granted patents and patent applications filled from the date of the first round of 
investment until the date of the second round of investment (PatentApp_2 and 
PatentGrant_2).10   As discussed in section 2, PatentApp_1 and PatentGrant_1 are included in 
                                                 
8 As noted, our expectation on the signaling value of applications emanate from a learning-by-doing 
process and a fine-tuning process. The measure of applications we use (number of applications submitted) 
is consistent with both processes. It captures the learning-by-doing effects because it measures the 
intensity a given firm applies for patents. It captures the fine-tuning process because a. the length of time 
it takes from an application to be granted at the USPTO is extensive (Mabey Jr, 2010), on average two 
and a half years for our sample patents, and b. between 85 to 90 percent of applications turn to patents at 
the USPTO (Quillen and Webster, 2001). As such, the more applications a firm submits the more exposed 
it becomes to fine-tuning procedures because chances are that before the applications become patents 
there is extensive communication between the firm and the patent authorities.    
9 While empirical evidence on the drivers of signaling value of the intensity a given firm submits patent 
applications is scarce, personal correspondence of the authors with Dutch and US-based VCFs attends to 
this argument. This correspondence also indicated that potential differences in the economic value 
between applications and granted patents (e.g. applications but not granted patents are open to revisions 
that could create uncertainty for competitors) does not typically weigh in heavily in investment decisions 
particularly for VCFs with expertise and experience to approximate beforehand the granted claims of a 
given application.    
10 As we illustrate in Appendix Figure 1, to avoid double-counting PatentApp_1 measures only the 
number of applications that were not granted patent rights before the first round (for the round 1 
regression) or between the first and the second round (for the round 2 regression); that is we exclude 
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the analysis of the second round in order to test whether patent activity indeed serves a signaling 
function; if it conveys a quality signal, then PatentApp_1 and PatentGrant_1 should have 
explanatory power for the funds raised in the first round of financing but not for the second.  
Along the same lines, under the premise that patent activity serves a signaling function, 
PatentApp_2 and PatentGrant_2 should not augment the amount of funds raised in round 2. If 
other potential advantages conferred by patents, such as discounted rents, are the prime reasons 
for the attraction of VCFs to patents, then PatentApp_2 and PatentGrant_2 should have 
significant explanatory power in the amount of funds raised in round 2.  Therefore, in line with 
our hypotheses, we expect the patent activity before the second round of investment to have a 
diminished influence on the level of venture capital funds received by the focal firm in the 
second round.  
 In order to most effectively evaluate whether patents act as a signal that can attract 
venture capital funds, we need to account for the differential economic value of patents as VCFs 
will tend to invest in firms with the highest quality of intellectual property and greater future 
value.  That is, we need to tease out the (economic) value of the patent itself from its signaling 
value.  To do so, we follow previous literature (Gambardella et al., 2008; Harhoff et al., 2003; 
Häussler et al., 2009; Trajtenberg, 1990) and we approximate patent economic value with a 
variable that measures the average number of times a patent has been cited by other patents (i.e. 
forward citations) (PatentCiteYear_1) 11.  Higher citation levels imply superior scientific 
                                                                                                                                               
applications whose grant we include in the PatentGrant_1 and PatentGrant_2 variable.  As a 
consequence, the PatentApp_1 variable for a given firm can be different across regressions: if an 
application was applied for before round 1 and it was granted between round 1 and round 2, it is included 
in the PatentApp_1 variable in the round 1 regression but not in the PatentApp_1 variable in the round 2 
regression. Overall, the scheme we employ to construct our patent activity variables could materially 
truncate the PatentApp_1 variable insofar as a. the elapsed time between the founding of the firm and the 
receipt of first round funds was extended or b. the elapsed time between financing rounds was extended. 
But, as we show in Tables 1a and 1b and explain in footnote 25: a. on average, our sample firms received 
their first round of financing almost 30 months (2.54 years) after their birth and b. the average elapsed 
time between rounds in our sample is 13 months. Both of those figures are below (or closely approaching) 
the average 30 months that elapsed between the application and the grant date at the USPTO for the 
patents in our sample.  It follows that from either source of potential truncation, the truncation is minimal.  
To illustrate, only 17 applications whose patent pendency time was below 13 months were omitted from 
PatentApp_1 because they were included in PatentGrant_2.  Including these applications in the analysis 
yields qualitatively similar results. 
11 Our choice to use forward citations as a proxy for patent economic value is based on strong empirical 
evidence. For instance, recent results suggest that forward citations are reliable predictors of the auction 
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significance or applicability and are taken to indicate higher quality patents. Indeed, Fischer and 
Leidinger (2013) and Sneed and Johnson (2009) when they correlate the auction price of patents 
--- a direct measure of patent economic value --- with the number of forward citations reveal 
that forward citations are closely associated with the economic value of patents.  In the 
specification of the second round, besides PatentCiteYear_1 we also include a similar variable 
that measures the forward citations of patents granted from the date of the first round until the 
date of the second round (PatentCiteYear_2). 12  We expect patents of higher economic value to 
attract greater amounts of funds in both investment rounds. 
 The patent activity of a focal firm before the first round of financing is by definition 
unaffected by the involvement of VCFs in the firm. But, the patent activity before the second 
round of investment can be influenced by managerial advice under the consulting role that 
VCFs assume once they invest in a firm.  That is, if patent activity after the first round is 
influenced by the involvement of VCFs in the firm, the empirical model of round 2 could suffer 
from specification bias.  To account for it, in the specification of the second round we include in  
the lagged dependent variable in level form (i.e. the dependent variable in the first specification, 
in level form, which is the total amount invested in the first round of investment – 
                                                                                                                                               
price of patents (Fischer and Leidinger (2013); Sneed and Johnson (2009)). Because in patent auctions the 
bidders buy only the patent and not the seller firm (or any other type of institutions that holds the patents) 
this setting is as close as one can get to reliably approximate the economic value of patents. Nevertheless, 
the small number of studies that have provided these estimates may cast some doubt about their 
generalizability. Towards this end, an important observation is that the patent value estimates from 
Fischer and Leidinger (2013) and Sneed and Johnson (2009) are well within the range of patent value 
estimates reported previously from studies that do not use patent auction data (e.g. Trajtenberg (1990)) 
and as such they may be measuring both the economic and the signaling value of a given patent. The 
observation that the patent value estimates from the auction and the non-auction studies are within range 
is important because a. it implies that even in the non-auction settings what is captured is, for the most 
part, economic patent value and b. given that forward citations explain a significant part of the patent 
value derived by non-auction settings (Trajtenberg (1990)), it significantly extends the empirical evidence 
demonstrating that forward citations capture economic patent value. Finally, in alternative approaches to 
estimate the economic value of a given patent (i.e. by asking investors the price they would sell their 
patent had they known its value a priori) the evidence, again, shows that forward citations are the most 
reliable proxy (Gambardella et al., 2008).  Importantly, as robustness check in section 5.2 we present 
models in which we employ different measures of patent economic value (patent family size) and reach 
similar conclusions to our baseline models.   
12 Note that the number of forward citations is not a measure that is fully observable by the VCFs when 
they invest in the firm because VCFs are able to observe only the citations that have been received by the 
time they invest. Further, more recent patents tend to receive fewer citations compared to older patents 
mainly due to the effective time a patent may need until it becomes visible. To account for this 
observation we divide the average number of forward citations for the patents of a given firm by the age 
of the patent measured in years (citations are measured up to early summer of 2012). Then, we average 
out the average number of forward citations per firm patent. 
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VCF_Investment_1) (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Jacobson, 1990).13 Given that conditional on 
the receipt of funds, the amount per round generally increases with more advanced rounds 
(Gompers, 1995), we expect a positive sign for this variable.   
 In return for their investment, VCFs become part owners of the target firm.  The size of 
the amount they invest in order to become part owners depends heavily on two factors: i) the 
valuation of the firm ex ante and ii) the percentage of equity they receive.  It follows that we 
need to account for both of those factors but finding direct measures for such factors is 
empirically challenging. As such, we use two indicators that can approximate the conceptual 
variables. Specifically, for both rounds we construct round-specific variables that assume 
increasing values for investments directed towards later stages of firm growth (GrowthStage_1 
and GrowthStage_2).14  Generally, the valuation of firms, ex ante, increases with the stage of 
firm growth (Cumming and Dai, 2011) and in this respect these indicators should approximate 
firm valuation.  Importantly, early and later stage investments by VCFs are also typically 
associated with different equity shares (Beaton, 2010; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).  As such, 
the GrowthStage indicators should be correlated with the amount of equity secured by VCFs. 
Given the increased valuation that accompanies firms at later stages of firm growth, we expect a 
positive sign for the variable at hand.  We also construct another indicator to approximate the 
fraction of equity VCFs receive in exchange for their investments which is based on the finding 
that VCFs with stronger reputation typically receive larger equity  than investors with weaker 
reputation for the similar investment (Hsu, 2004).  As such, we include in both specifications a 
                                                 
13 Lagged dependent variables are generally more meaningful in panel data structures.  While lagged 
dependent variables in cross sectional data, like in our application, are less regular, they have been used 
previously (see Hochberg et al., 2007 for an example).  Nevertheless, in order to test for the empirical 
relevance of the lagged dependent variable included in our models, in unreported models the estimates 
from specifications that do not include the lagged variable are largely in line with the main results 
presented in Table 3 and imply that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable does not greatly 
influence our empirical estimates.  
14 Venture capital investments are directed towards different phases of firm growth, with each phase 
associated with different degrees of risk exposure and potential returns to the investor (Flynn and Forman, 
2001). Seed stage funds are typically small amounts directed primarily towards proving a concept. Early 
stage funds are directed mainly towards product development. Funds directed towards the expansion 
stage are used, in large part, to boost market entry or strengthen R&D (Jeng and Wells, 2000). There are 
also funds directed towards later stage financing, such as buy-outs or acquisitions. 
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variable that reflects the Lee et al. (2011) reputation score of the highest ranked funding VCF of 
the first round of financing (VCFreputation_1).15 
 To account for additional signals used by emerging firms that tend to leverage the 
reputation and previous business history of the team around the firm (Arvanitis and Stucki, 
2012; Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Bonardo et al., 2011; Certo, 2003; Elitzur and Gavious, 
2003; Gompers et al., 2010; Lee, 2001; Shane, 2000) in both specifications we include a 
variable that takes the value of 1 if one of the founders of the focal firm is a preeminent member 
of the academic community16 and/or has started a firm previously (FounderSignal).  Along the 
same lines, once the venture capital investment has been made, the reputation of the investors 
can also act as a signal since successful investors are presumed to possess skills that allow them 
to effectively identify firms with economic potential (Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; 
Sorenson and Stuart, 2001).  By extension, we expect the abovementioned variable 
VCFreputation_1 in the specification of the second round to also capture effects of this kind. In 
line with the discussion in section 2, we expect FounderSignal to influence the total amount 
invested in the first round of financing and this effect to die off for the second round. For 
VCFreputation_1 we expect it to be positively related with the total venture capital amount 
raised in the second round of financing. 
 In addition to the signaling effect that funding VCFs can have, their availability of 
funds can also influence the growth of venture capital funds invested in a given firm. Because 
such availability is often largely determined by the number of investors that spread the risks of 
their investments (i.e. by the syndication size)  (Lockett and Wright, 2001) as well as by the 
capital available to the investors (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Tian, 2011)  we include two 
variables that measure the number of investors per round as well as their average size in both 
specifications and expect positive signs for both coefficients (SyndicateInvestors1, 
                                                 
15 As we explain in section 4, in our dataset the investors of round 1 and round 2 are largely the same.  As 
a result, to avoid double-counting, in the specification of the second round we include only the reputation 
score of the round 1 investors and not the round 2 investors. Nevertheless, even when the reputation of 
the round 2 investors is included in the analysis, the results remain nearly identical to the baseline 
estimates. 
16 We code an academic founder as eminent if she holds a distinguished and/or named professorship 
and/or is a member of the Academy of Sciences and/or has won a Nobel Prize.  
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SyndicateInvestors2, SyndicateSize1, SyndicateSize2).  Since in syndicates of VCFs the most 
proximate VCF is usually the most heavily involved in the day-to-day operation of the target 
firm (Ferrary, 2010), the last variable we include in the empirical models that relates to the 
funding VCFs is the distance between the most proximate funding VCF and the target firm 
(DistanceClosestVCF). Spatial proximity between target firms and investors typically eases the 
monitoring functions of VCFs (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Zook, 2005)  and can lead to higher 
investments  (Tian, 2011).  We therefore expect a negative sign for the coefficient of this 
variable.  
Because agglomeration externalities (e.g. knowledge spillovers and network effects) 
from different types of organizations often positively influence the performance of high 
technology firms (Coenen et al., 2004; Döring and Schnellenbach, 2006; Gittelman, 2007; 
Kolympiris and Kalaitzandonakes, 2013a, b; Kolympiris et al., 2011) we include in both 
specifications  variables that account for such potential influences. The first variable measures 
the number of universities that perform biotechnology related research and are located in the 
same MSA as the focal firm (UniversitiesInMSA) and we expect a positive sign (Abel and 
Deitz, 2012; Anselin et al., 2000; Varga, 2000).   As well, we account for potential proximity 
effects from the presence of VCFs and over-performing DBFs in the vicinity (Beaudry and 
Breschi, 2003; Gompers, 1995; Shane and Cable, 2002). Following Kolympiris et al. (2011) for 
each round of financing we construct corresponding variables that measure the density of VCFs 
and the number of patents granted to biotechnology firms before the focal financing round in 0 
to 10 and 10 to 20 miles from the origin firm respectively (VCFarea_0010_1, 
VCFarea_1020_1, VCFarea_0010_2, VCFarea_1020_2, PATENTarea_0010_1, 
PATENTarea_1020_1, PATENTarea_0010_2, PATENTarea_1020_2) . We expect positive 
signs for the corresponding coefficients.  
We also measure the age of the focal firm at the round of financing (Age1, Age2).  We 
do not form strong priors with regard to the direction the age of firms can move the amount of 
funds received because VCFs may evaluate positively older firms due to higher experience and 
survival but they may also view negatively older firms that have not received previous 
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financing. To incorporate in the analysis year-to-year variations such as “hot IPO market” 
periods (Lowry and Schwert, 2002)17 that can encourage or discourage venture capital 
investments at an aggregate level we include in our empirical models a set of year dummies that 
match with the year in which the investment took place.   
With respect to estimation techniques, we employ White’s standard errors because the 
heteroskedasticity tests we conduct (seen in Tables 2 and 3) show evidence of 
heteroskedasticity.  We also test for the possibility that some of the errors in our models might 
be correlated. This may hold largely because there are often regional factors that are difficult to 
observe and which can affect the performance of all firms in a region or the capital investments 
they attract.  For instance, such factors may include state subsidies and technical assistance for 
the development and financing of high technology firms and other such activities.18  Factors of 
this sort can therefore cause DBFs of a given state to overperform or underperform jointly.  If 
such influences do exist, the assumption of independence across observations for firms in the 
same state may be violated (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007; Stimson, 1985).  To address this 
possibility we estimate both specifications with standard errors of firms in the same state 
modeled as correlated (i.e. clustered at the state level). 
                                                 
17 On top of the variables described in this section, we further tested the influence of a number of 
moderation and interaction terms (e.g. the influence of the founder signal on the impact of the firm 
growth stage variables as a means to control for possible cofounding effects on the valuation of firms by 
VCFs).  These variables did not improve significantly the statistical fit of the empirical models and they 
were generally not statistically strong.  As such, we omit them from the analysis.  However, we maintain 
in the analysis one of the interaction terms we tested for; the interaction between PatentGrant_1 and 
UniversitiesInMSA in large part because we consider it particularly relevant from a theoretical perspective 
in that it tests whether the knowledge generation of nearby universities influences the impact of the 
signaling value of patents. 
18 Additional factors may refer to attitudes towards risky investments or the efficacy of consulting 
organizations (e.g. the Larta Institute or Foresight S&T) that can assist firms in improving their 
performance. Such features can expand beyond the geographic boundaries of 10 or 20 miles, which is the 
geographic boundary for the variables we employ to describe the regional environment. Largely because 
of the qualitative nature of those features, representing them through associated variables is a task with 
mounting difficulties and as such we opt for clustering the standard errors at the state level to control for 
their potential effects.  The analysis with the clustered standard errors is conducted by estimates produced 
with generalized estimating equations which is a method of calculating the standard errors by first 
estimating the variability within the defined cluster (in our application the state) and then sums across all 
clusters (Zorn, 2006).  
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4. Data sources and presentation 
To perform our empirical analyses, we began by measuring all venture capital 
investments toward dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs) from 2001 up to 2011 using 
Thomson Reuter’s SDC Platinum Database (SDC).19 We also sourced from SDC the address 
and founding date of each DBF, the amount invested per round, the firm growth stage each 
investment was directed to, the date of financing round, the investors per round as well as their 
address and previous investments.  We used this information to construct our dependent 
variables (USD_R1 and USD_R2) and Age1, Age2, SyndicateInvestors1, SyndicateInvestors2, 
SyndicateSize1, SyndicateSize2, DistanceClosestVCF, VCFarea_0010_1, VCFarea_1020_1, 
VCFarea_0010_2, VCFarea_1020_2, GrowthStage_1, GrowthStage_2.  For 
DistanceClosestVCF, VCFarea_0010_1, VCFarea_1020_1, VCFarea_0010_2, 
VCFarea_1020_2 we needed to calculate the distance between the target firm and investors and 
the density of VCFs in a region.20 To do so, we converted the addresses of target firms and 
VCFs to coordinates at http://batchgeo.com.  Subsequently, we plugged these coordinates in the 
distance formula21 we employ and constructed the corresponding variables.  
For our variables PatentApp_1, PatentGrant_1, PatentApp_2, PatentGrant_2 we used 
Google Patents ® which indexes granted patents and patent applications from the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).22 We searched for every granted patent and patent 
                                                 
19 We focus on this time period because for this period the number of patents and patent applications are 
available from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Before November 29, 2000 
there was no formal obligation for the publication of patent applications from the USPTO. To test the 
sensitiveness of our empirical estimates to having only observations after 2001 in section 5.2 we present 
models that include venture capital investments that took place since 1974. In these models we include 
only the number of granted patents as our measure of patent activity. These results are qualitatively 
equivalent to the results presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
20 The density of VCFs did not include the funding VCFs of the focal firm. 
21 We employed the general formula of the spherical law of cosines which corrects for Earth’s spherical 
shape: Distance12 = ar cos(sin(lat1).sin(lat2)+cos(lat1).cos(lat2).cos(long2−long1)) ×3963 
22 See http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/10_22.jsp for an official USPTO press release regarding its 
cooperation with Google Patents ®. In particular, under this agreement USPTO provided all of its patent 
documents to Google largely because the latter has the technical capacity to provide patent data in bulk. 
Compared to other popular databases often used in the literature such as Patstat and the NBER database, 
since the data source is identical (USPTO), the information provided is in large part comparable. For our 
purposes, the main advantage of Google Patents ® was the ease of retrieving patent counts and 
applications by using slightly different names of each company without having to search within one file 
but rather by connecting to the Google Patents ® interface. 
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application where the focal firm was listed as the applicant/assignee.23 Using the application and 
granted date we allocated patent activity between rounds. To construct PatentCiteYear_r1and 
PatentCiteYear_r2 we employed Google Patents ® and counted the number of times each of the 
patents in our dataset was cited by other patents.  Then, for each firm we calculated the average 
number of citations across all granted patents of the firm.  As noted in footnote 12, to account 
for the tendency of older patents to be cited more heavily, we divided the average number of 
forward citations for the patents of a given firm by the difference (in years) between early 
summer of 2012 (when the variable was constructed) and the date that the patent was granted. 
To collect biographical information for the academic founders we visited the website of 
each firm and complemented this search with academic founders’ biographies provided at their 
personal websites. Using these sources, firms whose founder(s) had started a firm previously 
and/or held a distinguished and/or named professorship and/or were a member of the Academy 
of Sciences and/or had won a Nobel Prize took the value of 1 in the FounderSignal dummy 
variable.  
To build VCFreputation_1 we first consulted the yearly reputation rankings of VCFs 
maintained at http://www.timothypollock.com/vc_reputation.htm (Lee et al., 2011). DBFs 
whose funding VCFs at the time of the financing round were not ranked, were coded as 0. DBFs 
whose highest ranked VCF was also the highest ranked of all VCFs were coded as 1. To 
illustrate how we calculated our reputation indicator we provide here an example for which the 
highest rated VCF was ranked as 250th in the year in question. To construct our index we first 
divide 250 by 1000 (the total number of ranked VCFs) which yields 0.25 and then we subtract 
0.25 from 1 to have 0.75, which is the value of the VCFreputation_1 variable for this 
hypothetical example.  Along the same lines, if the highest rated VCF was ranked 150th, the 
value of the VCFreputation_1 variable would be 0.85. And so on.      
To construct UniversitiesInMSA we used the list of recipient institutions of 
biotechnology-related research grants maintained at the website of the National Institutes of 
                                                 
23 In a number of cases the name of the applicant/assignee differed across patents as, for instance, “inc.” 
was missing or it was replaced by “inc”. To ensure that the validity of our measure was not prone to such 
issues we double-checked the number of patents using a number of variations of the name of each firm.   
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Health. We complemented this list with comparable listings from the Association of University 
Technology Managers and the Chronicles of Higher Education. All three sources had 
information on the main address of each institution and whenever information was missing we 
visited the website of each institution to collect the address. The addresses were then assigned to 
MSAs using the zip code-to MSA list provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.   
Finally, to build PATENTarea_0010_1, PATENTarea_1020_1, PATENTarea_0010_2, 
and PATENTarea_1020_2 we first visited Google Patents ® to measure the yearly total number 
of patents assigned to each DBF.  Then, we summed over the patents that were granted before 
each round of financing to DBFs within 0 to 10 and 10 to 20 miles from the origin DBF (using 
the coordinates and the distance formula previously described). 
-----Tables 1a and 1b about here ---- 
 
Tables 1a and 1b presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
models.  As described by the modal values of the two dependent variables we use in the 
analysis, most DBFs in the dataset received $1 million for the first round of financing and $10 
million for the second round of financing.24  Note that the standard deviation is larger than the 
mean observed value which indicates the wide array of venture capital amounts invested in 
different firms.  Most firms did not have any patent activity before the focal round of financing, 
but the standard deviation of the observed patenting activity surpasses the average of the 
observed values and suggests that some firms had a large number of patents and patent 
applications before the focal round of financing.  This is an important observation because it 
indicates that our sample is composed of firms with varying degrees of patent activity and thus 
it alleviates concerns of overstressing the significance of patents that might result from the 
potential tendency of better firms to patent more and better protect their intellectual property 
                                                 
24 As seen in Tables 1a and 1b the minimum value for the amount raised for a given firm in our sample is 
below $10,000, which, especially in biotechnology, is uncommon. We verified this amount with our data 
source but to ensure that a potential misreporting would not affect our estimates we run the baseline 
regression omitting the amount at hand and reached almost identical results. 
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assets (Helmers and Rogers, 2011).25  The majority of the patents granted to firms in our sample 
did not receive any citations per year. 
Most of the firms in the dataset were close to four months (0 years in Table 1a) and two 
years old when they received first and second round of financing which were mostly directed to 
the seed and startup stage respectively.26  The average reputation score for the highest ranked 
funding VCF in either round was 0.37 which translates to a yearly ranking of 630 out of 1000.27 
One hundred and nineteen firms in the first round dataset had a founder that was coded as 
conveying a signal of quality (the corresponding value for firms that went to the second round 
was 101).  For half of the firms in either round the closest funding VCF was located within 
about 20 miles distance from the firm. DBFs received funds mostly from 1 VCF both in the first 
and the second round of financing and the average number of investors for the first and the 
second round of financing was 2.6 and 3, respectively.  With regard to the size of the investors, 
on average, they had invested around 367 million before providing first round financing to the 
firm and 438 million before providing second round financing to the firm.  
With respect to the regional environment of the average focal firm, around 9 
universities were located in the same MSA, roughly 24 VCFs were located in a 0 to 10 miles 
                                                 
25 In a similar vein, an alternative explanation could be that larger firms patent more. To check this 
argument we used LexisNexis Academics, Business Insights: Essentials and Business Source Premier to 
assess the size distribution, via employee counts, of the DBFs in our dataset at the time they received the 
focal round of financing. But, employee counts for the specific point in time in which a particular DBF 
received the venture capital investment were difficult to source. Nevertheless, the statistics for the 196 
DBFs that we could find their number of employees at the timing of round 1 indicate that 150 DBFs (or 
76.5 percent of the 196 firms) had less than 25 employees. In fact, the standard deviation of the variable 
in question was below the average, the modal value was 3 and 96 firms had less than 10 employees. In 
all, these statistics suggest that our sample is relatively homogeneous in terms of firm size. This is a 
relevant consideration because it implies that the growth of venture capital funds in our sample is not 
primarily driven by firm size. Further note that we searched for the size of the firms at round 1 because 
the time span between rounds in the dataset was relatively short implying that firm size between rounds 
did not change drastically.  More specifically, the average time between round 1 and round 2 was 13 
months with a standard deviation of 10 months and a modal value of 7 months. Interestingly, this 
homogeneous distribution in terms of time span between rounds is particularly relevant for the estimates 
of round 2 because it indicates that the effective time for the reduction of information asymmetries 
between VCFs and DBFs is relatively similar across firms. As such, potential differences in the reduction 
of information asymmetries that may result from different time spans between rounds do not appear to 
raise significant concerns. 
26 Note that the relatively uniform age in which the sample firms receive their first round of financing 
alleviates concerns that maybe better firms (or/and those that better protect their intellectual property) in 
the dataset did not necessarily receive the most funds during that round but they did receive them faster 
(Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013 page 772).  
27 1-(630/1000)=0.37 
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radius and approximately 15 VCFs in a 10 to 20 miles radius.  Further, in information not 
reported in Tables 1a and 1b, we note that our dataset draws from both urban and rural areas. 
Finally, the average DBF in our sample was surrounded by DBFs that in sum had been granted 
around 200 patents before the focal DBF received funds (approximately 130 patents were 
granted to firms in a 0 to 10 miles distance and roughly 70 patents were granted to firms in a 10 
to 20 miles distance).    
5. Empirical results 
5.1 The Impact of Patent Activity on Venture Capital Financing 
Tables 2 and 3 present the estimated coefficients for the models described in section 3. First we 
report the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and the associated significance levels and in 
the last two columns of Tables 2 and 3 we report the corresponding information for standard 
errors clustered at the state level.  The statistical inferences from the two sets of standard errors 
are nearly identical (the coefficients are by definition the same) and hence the models are robust 
to these alternative specifications. 
The fit statistics reported at the bottom of those Tables indicate the joint significance of 
the variables in the empirical models and suggest that the fitted models have explanatory power. 
Finally, the multicollinearity condition index (13.36 and 13.40 for each model) is within limits 
and do not raise concerns about the presence of multicollinearity (Greene, 2003). Nevertheless, 
as part of our robustness checks, in section 5.2 we present regressions with only a limited 
number of regressors where the multicollinearity index is lower and still find qualitatively 
similar results. Relatedly, as shown in the correlation tables presented in Appendix Tables l and 
2, the correlation coefficient among the granted patents before round 1 and the granted patents 
after round 1 is inflated (0.78).28  Accordingly, the separate impact of each variable in the model 
of round 2 may be difficult to measure due to such correlation. In section 5.2 we present models 
                                                 
28 This correlation coefficient is inflated by a single firm which has 20 granted patents in round 1 and 22 
granted patents in round 2. When we exclude this firm from the sample the correlation coefficient drops 
drastically to 0.28. As well, excluding this firm from the analysis does not impact the baseline estimates 
in any material way. 
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where the patent activity measures of round 1 are omitted from the analysis and reach similar 
conclusion to the baseline estimates of Tables 2 and 3. 
-----Tables 2 and 3 about here ---- 
Because the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, the estimated coefficients can be 
interpreted as semi-elasticities. In line with theoretical expectations, we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that patents act as a signal that attracts venture capital investments for the first round 
of investment and have a diminished effect for the second round of investment.29 In particular, 
one additional patent application before the first round of financing increases the amount of 
funds raised by a firm by 7.7 percent.  This is a considerable increase especially when 
considering the 0 modal value for the PATENTApp_1 variable and suggests that firms without 
patent activity generally receive significantly less funding from VCFs. To put the magnitude of 
the estimated coefficient in perspective, when evaluated at the average amount of first round 
funds observed in the sample (Table 1a) the estimated coefficient indicates that one additional  
patent application increases venture capital investments by $557,33330 when the modal value of 
the first round of financing is $1,000,000.  When compared to the direct costs of obtaining a 
patent, which typically range between $10,000 and $38,000 (Graham et al., 2009; Lemley, 
2000), the estimated signaling value of such a patent far surpasses these direct costs.  While this 
comparison is not meant to be a cost-benefit ratio for the acquisition of patents by DBFs, our 
empirical results strongly suggest that the signaling value of patenting activity is very 
significant and should be explicitly accounted for when firm strategy and public policy consider 
the usefulness of patents. 
Patent activity does not appear to attract higher amounts of second round venture capital 
investments, implying that a reduction of information asymmetries between investors and target 
firms leads to a decrease in the signaling value of patent activity. Notably, patent activity before 
                                                 
29 Technically, as an anonymous reviewer correctly points out, similar to a large body of empirical 
literature in a number of domains we cannot accept the hypothesis: by research design while we control 
for a type I error (wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis) we cannot control for a type II error (wrongly 
accepting the null hypothesis that patent activity has no effect in the second round).  
30 0.0773*7.21M (the average amount of first round funds reported in Table 1a)=557,333 
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the first round of financing influences only the first round of financing funds and patent activity 
after the first round of financing does not influence the amount of funds raised in the second 
round. These findings are in line with Hypothesis 1 and, importantly, indicate that patent 
activity carries a significant signaling value that diminishes once the hidden quality of a given 
firm is better assessed by the investors.  Our empirical results also suggest that while patent 
applications play an important signaling role, the granted patents of a focal firm do not appear to 
attract additional funds either in the first or in the second round of financing.  This result is 
consistent with previous findings (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Häussler et al., 2009) and it 
likely suggests that because patent applications may be stronger in conveying a firm that does 
not sit idle they are seen more favorably by investors.31 Interestingly, patents of higher 
economic value, as proxied by forward patent citations, did not appear to prompt VCFs towards 
larger investments either in round 1 or in round 2.32 
The coefficient of the GrowthStage_l variable indicates that when the first round of 
financing occurs at later stages of firm development, the amount invested by VCFs increases 
considerably. Hence, this indicator seems to capture effectively the elevated financial inflows 
needed for later stage investments. The coefficient of the GrowthStage_2 for round 2 financing 
is not statistically significant, however.  
Similar to the diminishing signaling value of patent activity, the founder signal 
significantly improved only the level of the first round of financing, when information 
asymmetries are prevalent.  The reputation of the first round investors did not influence the 
level of funding in the second round of investment for the DBFs in our sample.  Indeed, most of 
the firms received funds from a single investor (Tables 1a and 1b), who in most cases was the 
                                                 
31 We note however, that the joint significance test of granted patents and patent applications suggests 
that patent activity influences the first round of investment but not the second. Therefore, while per se 
granted patents may not exert a significant influence on venture capital attraction, when considered in 
conjunction with applications, they matter for the first round of investment. 
32 In unreported models where the GrowthStage variables are not included in the analysis, the forward 
citations variable is statistically significant for round 1. Therefore, it appears that VCFs are attracted to 
patents that may yield higher returns (i.e. higher quality patents) but such effect lessens once calculations 
about the ex-ante valuation of the firm come in place. Note that such finding can be informative for the 
relevance of forward citations as a measure of economic patent value. 
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main investor in the second round as well. As such, our finding may reflect this funding 
structure in our sample. 
Our results on the influence of the syndication of investors are in line with theoretical 
expectations and recent literature findings (Tian, 2011).  In particular, we find that investments 
by large groups of wealthy syndicated VCFs are associated with higher levels of capital 
investments in a given firm.  In fact, for the second round of financing the characteristics of the 
funding VCFs are prime determinants of the venture capital funds invested in a given firm.  
Finally, we find that firms funded by closely located VCFs receive, on average, less per round 
of financing.  One additional mile in the distance between the target firm and the closest 
investor increases the total amount of financing by approximately 0.03 percent.33   
The density of VCFs and patents in a 10 mile radius positively influences only the first 
round level of financing and not the second. We find these results particularly interesting 
because proximity effects appear to matter when firms are younger and less so when firms are 
more developed and experienced; a finding that sides with previous evidence that less 
established firms tend to benefit the most from proximity effects (McCann and Folta, 2011).  
These results imply that DBFs in early stages of development benefit from proximity effects but 
as they mature, performance benefits from access to local knowledge are not as pronounced.  
Finally, the density of universities in an MSA does not appear to influence the accumulation of 
venture capital funds of DBFs in the region in either round of financing. 
 Our control variables indicate that older firms receive more funds at the first round of 
financing and that year to year variations have only limited explanatory power in the amount of 
venture capital funds raised by firms. Similarly, the interaction term included in the analysis 
(granted patents * universities in the MSA) was not a statistically significant regressor. 
                                                 
33 This result is shaped, in some part, by the geographic distribution of VCFs and DBFs in our sample. 
Most of the firms in our sample source funds from VCFs located within walking distance and half of the 
firms receive funds from VCFs located less than 20 miles away (Tables 1a and 1b).  As such, the average 
distance between target firms and VCFs reported in Tables 1a and 1b (398 and 345 per round) is inflated 
somewhat by a small number of observations where East/West coast VCFs fund West/East coast DBFs in 
which typically larger VCFs provided significant amounts of finance to target firms across the country.  
Consequently, while statistically significant, the effect of the DistanceClosestVCF is expected to have a 
small overall economic effect for the majority of firms in our sample. 
25 
 
5.2 Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of our results we construct a number of additional models whose results 
we present in Table 4. 
-----Table 4 about here ---- 
Our main estimates rely on a sample of firms that received venture capital investments. 
But if these firms were more likely to receive funds from other firms in the first place, then our 
estimates could suffer from selection bias. Along the same lines, for the empirical model of 
round 2, we focus the analysis on firms that received such funds but if these firms differ from 
remaining firms, the estimates, again, could be biased. To address these issues we construct two 
Heckman selection models where for the model of round 1 in the first stage we model the 
probability that a firm receives venture capital and in the second stage we conduct the baseline 
analysis. In the selection model for round 2, we first model the probability that a firm receives 
second round financing and then analyze the factors that influence the amount it receives in that 
round. In the set of regressors we include variables such as patents, founder's status and receipt 
of government grants that have been previously shown to affect the chances of receiving 
venture capital and to influence the chances a firm receives second round investment (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2004; Lerner, 1999; MacMillan et al., 1986). To source the sample of firms that 
had not received venture capital funds we relied on proprietary data from InKnowVation 
reflecting all biotechnology firms that had won grants from the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program from 1983 to 2006.34 The dataset included firm-specific information 
such as patents and year of foundation as well as an indicator of whether or not the SBIR winner 
firms had received venture capital investments, with the majority of those firms not having 
                                                 
34 The dataset included all life science winners. In order to identify the biotechnology firms we performed 
a keyword search on the business description of all the firms. The list of biotechnology keywords was 
constructed after consulting with biotechnology researchers employed at the authors' institutions and 
included almost 400 keywords with about 100 of them characterizing the vast majority of the firms in the 
dataset (Kolympiris et al., 2014). These keywords included glycosylation, oligo-nucleotide, mutation, 
antigen, recombinant allergens, biofiltration, glycosylation, Bacillus thuringiensis, polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR), chondrocyte differentiation, biosynthesis, recombinant enzymes, genetic engineering, 
stem cells, bioprocessing, genetic, biotic stress, genetic parameters, chimeraplasty, introgression, 
biomedicine, reverse transcriptase, glycoprotein, directional cloning, western blot, combinatorial 
biocatalysis, arabidopsis, gene (DNA) sequencing. 
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received funds from VCFs.35  As shown in Models 1 and 2 of Table 4, the results remain nearly 
identical in magnitude, sign and statistical significance to our baseline estimates of Tables 2 and 
3 and indicate that any potential selection bias does not materially change our estimates. 
Our analysis uses data from 2001 to 2011 because it is in this period that both granted 
patents and patent application statistics are available from USPTO (granted patents are available 
for earlier years). Nevertheless, focusing solely on that period may mask differential effects that 
took place on earlier periods. Given that our data source on venture capital investments goes 
back to 1974, in Models 3 and 4 of Table 4 we present the results of empirical specifications 
that include only granted patents as the measure of patent activity and include observations that 
reflect investments that took place from 1974 to 2011 inclusive.  Importantly, these 
specifications do not directly test our hypotheses because only one of the two patent activity 
measures we employ is, by definition, available. The goal of these specifications is to check 
whether the insignificance of the granted patents variables holds when we extend the period of 
analysis. Indeed, in accordance with the main results presented in Tables 1 and 2, granted 
patents have no effect neither on the first round investment level nor on the second round 
investment level.  As well, inferences from the remaining regressors are similar to those in the 
baseline results. 
As seen in Tables 1a and 1b a small cohort of firms had a number of patents and patent 
applications that surpassed the average patent activity of the firms in the dataset. In Models 5 
                                                 
35 Instead of using the age variable in the first stage of the Heckman model we use the year of foundation. 
We do so because for the age variable to be meaningful in our application we need to model the 
probability that a firm receives venture capital investment within a specific period of time. However, by 
definition, such period of time does not exist for firms that did not receive venture capital investments.  
More to the list of variables we use for the selection equation, we employ only granted patents as our 
measure of patent activity in the first stage because a number of recipient firms received the award before 
2001 and as such the full list of submitted applications is not available from the USPTO (and hence from 
our data source, InKnowVation). The selection of the remaining variables we employ to construct the first 
stage of the Heckman model is guided, primarily, by findings of previous literature.  To illustrate, for the 
round 1 selection equation we include the SBIR and the location dummies based on the findings that a. 
SBIR winners are more likely to attract venture capital funds (Lerner, 1999) and b. that firms located in 
Massachusetts or California are more likely to attract funds (Lerner, 1999). The relationship of those 
factors with the amount of venture capital raised in the first round has not been replicated in the existing 
literature. As such, we consider these factors as relevant for the first and not for the second stage of the 
Heckman model. Factors for which empirical evidence is scarce but we theorize are relevant for both 
stages (e.g. FounderSignal) are included in both stages. Finally, note that even when different groups of 
variables are included in the selection equation, the results remain largely unchanged.  
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and 6 we test how these outlier observations impact our baseline results by re-estimating the 
models of Tables 2 and 3 using data that omits these observations from the analysis.36  By and 
large, the results agree with the estimates of Tables 2 and 3 that patent activity carries a 
signaling value that diminishes once the hidden quality of the DBFs is better approximated by 
the VCFs. A noteworthy result though is that the coefficient of the PatentApp_1 variable  
doubles in magnitude. We find this result particularly interesting because it implies that for 
firms with average patent activity the signaling value of patent applications is even more 
pronounced than the corresponding value for emerging DBFs with above average patent 
activity. 
In Model 7 we pooled the data for the first and the second round together to construct a 
pooled regression model that controls for firm and year fixed effects. The dependent variable in 
that model is the amount raised in a given investment round and the right-hand side variables 
are round-specific. Then, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
observation corresponds to first round investment and 0 otherwise. To test for the impact of 
patent activity on venture capital growth we add an interaction term that is the product of the 
number of patent applications and the dummy variable previously described.37 The marginal 
effect of PatentApp_138 indicates that patent activity is conducive to the increase of funds for 
the first round and negatively affects the level of the second round funds.  This result suggests 
that unobserved firm-specific time constant features can determine whether the overall trend of 
patent activity serving a signaling role that diminishes over time holds for a specific firm.  
                                                 
36 Specifically, for the model of round 1 we omitted 4 firms that had more than 10 patent applications 
before round 1. These same firms were omitted from the analysis of round 2. Additionally, for round 2, 
we omitted 5 firms that had 10 or more patent applications between the two rounds. Therefore, in total we 
omitted 9 firms from the analysis. The results remained nearly identical even when we omitted firms with 
more than 5 patent applications. 
37 We also interact the round 1 dummy with granted patents but the corresponding coefficient is not 
statistically significant. We do not include that interaction term in the analysis because the 
multicollinearity index of the model including both interaction terms increases to levels that create 
inference concerns. 
38 The marginal effect is the first derivative of the amount of funds raised with respect to the number of 
patent applications. Employing the estimated coefficients, the marginal effect of patent applications can 
then be calculated as -0.2388 * D - 0.0459 + 0.0896 * D where D equals 1 for observations in the first 
round and 0 otherwise.  
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To test the robustness of our estimates to the elevated correlation coefficient between 
the two variables that measure granted patents between rounds, in Models 8 and 9 we present 
estimates from i) a model that includes only patent activity measures after round 1 and ii) a 
model that includes only the two variables that are correlated (PatentGrant_1 and 
PatentGrant_2). Along the same lines, in models 10 and 11 we test whether the influence of the 
control variables is sensitive to the inclusion of the patent activity measures by constructing 
round 1 and round 2 models that include only the control variables. We draw two main 
conclusions from models 8 to 11. First, the influence of the control variables remains largely 
unchanged regardless of the inclusion of the patent activity variables. Second, the patent activity 
variables do not appear to be significantly affected by the correlation in question. Accordingly, 
we conclude that our main findings in the baseline models are robust. 
Finally, to test the sensitivity of our estimates to the (economic) patent value indicator 
we use in the baseline estimates, in Models 12 and 13 we replace the forward citations variables 
with variables that measure the average INPADOC39 family size of each patent owned by the 
focal firms. Patents in the same patent family typically protect the same (set of) invention(s) in 
different jurisdictions.  Patents that are then part of broad patent families are expected to have a 
higher economic value as the applicant has chosen to accrue additional costs for protection in 
multiple jurisdictions (Fischer and Leidinger, 2013; Harhoff et al., 2003; Lanjouw et al., 1998). 
The results in Models 12 and 13 are nearly identical to the baseline estimates and show that 
under alternative proxies of economic patent value our main conclusions remain intact. 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
A long stream of research has documented the positive effects that patents bring about 
to firms. The general consensus is that patents contribute to firm growth and survival because 
they confer monopolistic market rights, offer protection from competitors and enhance the 
                                                 
39 INPADOC, which stands for International Patent Documentation Center, is a patent information 
database that is maintained by the European Patent Office and contains cross-referenced data on patents 
gathered from national patent offices worldwide. The data to construct the variable were obtained from 
Thomson Innovation. 
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negotiating position of patent holders. What has received relatively less attention in this 
literature is that patents can act as a signal to attract investors and capital. These types of effects 
are particularly important to emerging firms in knowledge intensive industries where long 
research cycles, scientific complexities and strict regulatory regimes make the development of a 
track record for newly established firms difficult. In this context, signals that convey firm 
potential and quality can be particularly relevant.  A handful of empirical studies that have taken 
up the issue in the past have shown that knowledge intensive firms which hold granted patents 
or have patent applications are more likely to receive larger venture capital investments faster. 
Out of these studies only few have demonstrated that the reported results reflect signaling 
effects and only one has indicated that such signaling effects wane with time. As such, the 
dynamics of signaling effects have not been investigated in any significant depth, and little is 
known about whether the signaling function of patents diminishes over time. In this study, we 
shed new light on the signaling function of patents in attracting investors by examining the 
strength of the signaling effects of patent activity in sequential rounds of financing for small 
biotechnology firms. By extension, the overarching contribution of the present study is to be 
among the first to study the dynamics of signals.  
Employing data from more than 580 U.S.-based dedicated biotechnology firms, we 
examine whether the patent activity (granted patents and patent applications) of small 
biotechnology firms increases the amount of venture capital funds raised by such firms during 
their first and second round of financing. Our empirical results strongly corroborate theoretical 
expectations that patent activity before the first round of financing increases the capital invested 
in a firm. However, as firms mature and information asymmetries between them and investors 
decrease, the signaling value of patent activity diminishes and it does not affect the level of 
funds raised in the second round of financing. We also find that patent applications rather than 
granted patents have a more significant signaling role. This finding potentially reflects the 
notion that patent applications offer a stronger signal than patents perhaps because they convey 
information that young emerging firms are further developing due to the learning curve 
associated with the patent acquisition process.  Investments that are directed towards later firm 
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growth stages are also associated with higher amounts of capital investments. Finally, we find 
that the amount of venture capital funds raised by small biotech firms is also influenced by 
certain characteristics of the investors, such as size and syndication, as well as by proximity 
effects that allow firms to source knowledge from nearby institutions. 
Our study has both scholarly and policy implications. For instance, we quantify the 
signaling value of patent activity and we find that, on average, an additional patent application 
is associated with an increase of approximately $557,333 in the amount of venture capital funds 
raised in the first round of financing by small biotech firms. This estimate is generally robust to 
various model specifications that address potential bias that can result from focusing solely on 
firms that receive venture capital investments and to alternative empirical designs.  Importantly, 
this $557,333 valuation complements existing studies which estimate the value of patents but do 
not take into account the value of their signaling effect in attracting capital (Gambardella et al., 
2008). The same finding however, has also important policy implications. Concerns have been 
frequently raised about the current status of the patenting system and about the degree it might 
hinder innovation, especially by placing young innovative firms at a disadvantage (Kingston, 
2001). Our findings, however, suggest that the signaling value of patent activity not only 
exceeds the typical direct costs of patent acquisition manifold but it can also improve the access 
of small innovative firms to capital during early stages of financing, exactly when such firms 
lack a track record and information about their potential is less available. It is therefore clear, 
that any discussion about the value of patents for small innovative firms and for firm strategy 
should include such considerations. More specifically, the case can be made that due to the 
signaling value of patent activity, emerging firms who opt out of using it may be more inclined 
to reconsider their strategy. Accordingly, if these kinds of firms are fetched back to the patent 
system they could provide additional income to the patent authorities which could then 
potentially address common patent system issues such as backlogging of applications via hiring 
qualified examiners, providing employee bonuses and the like. 
Given these policy and firm-specific implications, of direct interest is then the 
applicability of our results to industries other than biotechnology and to countries other than the 
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US. With regard to applicability to other industries, we generally expect our findings to hold for 
emerging firms in industries that, like biotechnology, are prone to information asymmetries due 
to long research or development cycles with uncertain research and commercial outcomes that 
make quality signals useful. To corroborate these expectations, indeed, there is some limited 
empirical evidence suggesting that patents are positively associated with increases in venture 
capital in a number of such industries (Cao and Hsu, 2011) and in some countries outside the 
US (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Engel and Keilbach, 2007). 
There are several ways that our work can be extended. First, in depth analysis of the 
dynamics of signals, not confined to patents, seems promising especially given the dearth of 
research on the topic  (Higgins et al., 2011).  Such research can, for instance, analyze the factors 
that influence the strength and effectiveness of signals. These factors include transmission 
mechanisms and the a priori credibility of the signal transmitter. Second, a straightforward 
extension of the present work would be to track the growth of the firms who successfully 
transmit signals in order to evaluate the long term effects of signaling. Third, a potentially 
qualitative analysis could directly identify the firm-specific factors that can influence how 
strong is the overall trend of the diminishing signaling value of patents for a given firm.  Fourth, 
the dynamics of proximity effects on capital investment uncovered in this study may be worth 
further attention. Proximity effects were found to have a positive impact on the venture capital 
funds of small biotech firms only during the first round of financing when firms were in the 
early stages of development. It is therefore possible that knowledge spillovers from 
agglomeration and associated pecuniary effects may be stronger for smaller firms early in their 
innovation cycle. Such dynamic effects are not broadly researched in the agglomeration 
literature and it may be a worthwhile follow-up research topic.  
To conclude, we note that our study is not without limitations. For instance,  to account 
for the venture capital funds provided to a firm in exchange of equity in the firm we employ a 
variable that reflects the firm growth stage that venture capital funds are directed to and a 
variable that reflects the reputation of the investors. While we expect these variables to indeed 
be suitable proxies, data limitations do not allow us to use sharper measures such as the actual 
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equity level secured by the investors, which could yield more refined estimates. Along the same 
lines, assessing proprietary firm-specific information about (unsuccessful) patent applications 
before 2001 could provide further insights by expanding the time period of the analysis. Finally, 
based on a large body of empirical work we employ forward citations and patent family size to 
capture the economic value of patents.  However, by design, proxies are imperfect measures. As 
such, it is possible that the economic value of a given patent is not fully accounted for in our 
models. Direct inquires to the venture capital firms we study with regard to the economic value 
they ascribed to the sample patents would address the issue. But, such endeavor is prohibitively 
difficult in large part because a significant part of the investments we study took place more 
than a decade ago.  
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework  
The signaling effect of intellectual property owned by emerging high technology firms on the attraction of external capital 
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Appendix Figure 1. Hypothetical scenario illustrating how the patent activity measures are constructed 
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